Epidemiologic Clues to SARS Origin in China by Xu, Rui-Heng et al.
An epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) began in Foshan municipality, Guangdong
Province, China, in November 2002. We studied SARS
case reports through April 30, 2003, including data from
case investigations and a case series analysis of index
cases. A total of 1,454 clinically confirmed cases (and 55
deaths) occurred; the epidemic peak was in the first week
of February 2003. Healthcare workers accounted for 24%
of cases. Clinical signs and symptoms differed between
children (<18 years) and older persons (>65 years).
Several observations support the hypothesis of a wild ani-
mal origin for SARS. Cases apparently occurred independ-
ently in at least five different municipalities; early
case-patients were more likely than later patients to report
living near a produce market (odds ratio undefined; lower
95% confidence interval 2.39) but not near a farm; and 9
(39%) of 23 early patients, including 6 who lived or worked
in Foshan, were food handlers with probable animal con-
tact.
O
n March 12, 2003, the World Health Organization
(WHO) issued a global alert about cases of atypical
pneumonia in Guangdong Province and Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, China, and in Vietnam (1).
The disease, now known as severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS), is caused by coronavirus infection (2,3)
and subsequently spread rapidly worldwide. The earliest
identified cases of the disease occurred in Guangdong
Province in late 2002 (4).
On January 2, 2003, two cases of atypical pneumonia in
the city of Heyuan, Guangdong Province, were associated
with transmission of infection to several healthcare work-
ers at the hospital (5). Investigation by the Guangdong
Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention led
to the identification of clusters of cases in six other munic-
ipalities (Foshan, Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, Zhaoqing) from November 2002 to mid-
January 2003. On February 3, 2003, province-wide
mandatory case reporting of atypical pneumonia that used
a standard case definition and reporting form was institut-
ed. The provincial health department also introduced a
range of public health control measures, including guide-
lines on epidemiologic investigation of cases and contacts
(February 3) and on hospital admission, clinical manage-
ment, and infection control arrangements for patients
(February 9). Subsequently, the department issued guide-
lines on community prevention and control, including
mandatory home quarantine of contacts (March 27); com-
menced public service announcements about personal pro-
tection and seeking prompt medical attention (March 27);
and introduced free hospital treatment for patients with
SARS (April 30). Border control measures were intro-
duced at all points of entry into the province during mid-
April according to WHO recommendation (6). We
describe the epidemiology of the SARS epidemic in
Guangdong through April 30, 2003, focusing on the
observed pattern of spread of disease, the signs and symp-
toms, and the investigation of early cases. 
Methods
Study Population
Guangdong Province has a population of 85.2 million,
including 9.9 million in Guangzhou city (7). All public
health and most hospital services are under the direction of
the Health Bureau of Guangdong Provincial People’s
Government. The public health function is performed by
one provincial Center for Disease Control and several
municipal centers, together with a network of district and
county centers, each responsible for a population of
500,000–1 million. Nearly all hospitals are operated by
the public sector, but patients are charged for medical
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Data Sources
We analyzed data from two sources: the Guangdong sur-
veillance database and a case investigations database. We
also interviewed staff from the Guangdong Provincial
Centers for Disease Control, and Foshan Municipal Center
for Disease Control to obtain supplementary information on
early-onset cases. Information on early cases in the neigh-
boring Guangxi Province was obtained from local investi-
gators by a visiting WHO team, led by one of the authors
(CKL). Early cases were defined as those with a date of
onset from November 1, 2002, to January 31, 2003, and late
cases as those with a date of onset from February 1 to April
30, 2003. Population denominators were obtained from the
Guangdong provincial census for 2000 (7).
Surveillance Database
Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease Control coor-
dinated the surveillance database. Early cases were identi-
fied during the course of case investigations or after
voluntary reporting by clinicians. Such cases were only
included in the database if they conformed to the case def-
inition subsequently adopted for surveillance. Since early
February 2003, hospitals at all levels in the health system
were required to report cases of atypical pneumonia (prob-
able SARS) immediately by telephone to the local center
for disease control, which then forwarded reports electron-
ically to the provincial center on the same day. The diag-
nostic criteria for reporting were: 1) having close contact
with a patient or having infected other people, 2) fever
(>38°C) and symptoms of respiratory illness, 3) leukocyte
count <10.0 x 109/L, 4) radiographic evidence of infiltrates
consistent with pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome
on chest x-ray, and 5) no response to antimicrobial drug
treatment (within 72 hours). Patients were considered to be
probable SARS patients if they meet criteria 1–4 or 2–5 but
were excluded if an alternative diagnosis could fully
explain their illness. The dataset contains patient demo-
graphics, including occupation; dates of onset, admission
and report; criteria required for the case definition; and
details of laboratory specimens that were collected. 
Case Investigation Database
Contact tracing staff at the district center level adminis-
tered a standard questionnaire to all case-patients within 24
hours of reporting. These data form the basis of the case
investigation database and comprise patient demographics;
clinical features on admission to hospital; contact history
(living with, working with, caring for, or visiting the home
of a patient) and name, age, and address details of contacts;
and exposure risk factors for community cases (non-
healthcare workers), including travel history, hospital vis-
its, animal contact, and living conditions. Patients not
employed as healthcare workers were classified as com-
munity case-patients. Comparisons were made between
features of early-onset and late-onset community cases,
and primary (no contact history) and secondary communi-
ty cases. Extra information was collected on early patients
by means of informal interviews with center staff, which
focused on index patients in each of the seven municipali-
ties initially affected. Data were particularly sought on
occupational history and contact networks, and a detailed
case series was compiled. 
Data Analysis
Data were entered into Excel databases (Microsoft,
Redmond, WA). Descriptive analyses were carried out
using EpiInfo version 6 (Centers for Disease Control,
Atlanta, GA) and SPSS version 10.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago,
IL). The surveillance database was used for analysis by age,
sex, occupation, and clinical signs and symptoms. The case
investigation database was used for comparing early- and
late-onset cases and cases with or without a contact history.
Incidence rates were calculated for November 2002 to April
2003. For comparisons of signs and symptoms by age,
younger adults were used as the reference group for both
children and older persons. Chi-square test or, when appro-
priate, Fisher exact test was used for comparison of propor-
tions, Mann-Whitney test for comparison of continuous
variables, and chi-square test for linear trend for analysis of
time trends. We report maximum likelihood estimates for
odds ratios (OR) with exact 95% mid-p confidence inter-
vals (CI) and consider p < 0.05 to be significant.
Results
Surveillance Database
A total of 1,454 SARS cases were reported in
Guangdong Province from November 16, 2002, through
April 30, 2003, including 55 deaths, a crude case-fatality
rate of 3.8% for all ages, and 12.7% in people >65 years.
Two children died: a 4-year-old, previously healthy girl
with lobar pneumonia of unknown cause and a 10-year-old
boy with recent acute hepatitis B.
The initial phase of the epidemic, November–late
January, was characterized by sporadic cases followed by a
sharp rise in late January and a sharp decline in the first half
of February, and thereafter a gradual decline (Figure 1). The
epidemic peak occurred at the end of the first week of
February with approximately 55 new cases each day. Cases
occurred in 15 municipalities in the province but were con-
centrated in the Pearl River delta area (Figure 2A), and con-
fined almost exclusively to urban areas, particularly the
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Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhongshan, and Zhaoqing (located
20–130 km from Guangzhou). The highest incidence
occurred in Guangzhou city (12.5 cases per 100,000 peo-
ple) (Figure 2B), and outbreaks appear to have occurred in
different municipalities at varying stages of the epidemic
(Figure 3).
Median age of patients was 35.0 years (range 0–92
years), and the highest age-specific incidence was in per-
sons 65–69 years (3.2 per 100,000 people) (Figure 4);
53.2% of cases were female. Five deaths occurred among
343 cases in healthcare workers (24% of 1,429 cases for
whom occupation is known); 75.1% of healthcare worker
cases were in women. The proportion of healthcare work-
er patients was highest in the early phase of the epidemic
(32% with date of onset in January 2003) and declined as
the epidemic progressed (27% in February, 18% in March,
and 17% in April) (Table 1). Throughout the epidemic, a
high proportion of community case-patients did not report
contact history, ranging from 58% in February to 74% in
April. This proportion was even higher in children (91% in
those <5 years, 81% in those 5–14 years) and in persons
>65 years (82%).
Analysis of occupation status, excluding healthcare
workers and case-patients with known exposure, shows
that the proportion of cases in students (0% in January
2003 or before; 7% in February; 14% in March; 18% in
April, p < 0.001) and housewives (0% in January 2003 or
before; 5% in February; 14% in March; 15% in April, p <
0.001) increased as the epidemic progressed (Table 2). A
high proportion (9/23, 39%) of early cases were food han-
dlers (this category includes persons who handle, kill, and
sell food animals, as well as those who prepare and serve
food), but none were farmers handling livestock or poultry.
Of the nine early cases in food handlers, seven were
restaurant chefs working in township restaurants (where a
variety of animals were slaughtered on the premises), one
was a market produce buyer for a restaurant, and one was
a snake seller in a produce market (where a variety of live
animals were offered for sale). Six of the food handlers
lived or worked in Shunde (1.7 million population), an
urban district of Foshan municipality, though none could
be directly linked to each other through contact history.
Case Investigation Database
Detailed data from case investigation interviews were
available for 662 (45%) of 1,454 patients. Median age was
31.0 years (range 0–86 years), 56% were female, and 44%
were male. The signs and symptoms in adults (18–64
years) were compared with those in children (<18 years)
and older persons (>65 years) (Tables 3 and 4). Children
were more likely to have a runny nose and dry cough on
physical examination but less likely to have chills, malaise,
headache, muscle aches, or difficulty breathing. Older per-
sons were more likely to report having sputum and to have
a dry or productive cough on physical examination but less
likely to complain of chills, malaise, or sore throat. Nearly
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve of cases of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome by date of onset, November 1, 2002–April 30, 2003, in
Guangdong Province, China, showing cases in the community and
in healthcare workers. 
Figure 2. Geographic distribution of population in: (A) urban dis-
tricts of Guangzhou city, (B) Guangdong Province and district-spe-
cific incidence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (per 100,000
population).all patients had a high body temperature (median 39.0°C,
range 36.8–42.0°C) lasting in most patients for 1 to 4 days
(median 4.0 days; range 1–9 days). Median leukocyte
count was 5.8 x 109/L(range 1.0–63.4 x 109/L), and 13.9%
of patients had leukopenia (<3.5 x 109/L). Older persons
had a higher median leukocyte count than younger adults
(6.6 x 109/L for those >65 years, 5.6 x 109/L for those
18–64 years, p = 0.056), and fewer had leukopenia. 
Comparison of case categories indicate that community
case-patients with a contact history were more likely to
have visited a hospital in the previous 2 weeks than
patients without a contact history (OR 6.83, 95% CI 2.89
to 16.73) (Table 5). Patients without a contact history were
no more likely to report a history of travel or animal con-
tact. Early-onset patients were more likely to live within
walking distance of a produce market (an agricultural mar-
ket where live animals are sold, killed, and butchered in
situ, also known as a “wet market”) than late-onset patients
(OR undefined, lower 95% CI 2.39). Living near a poultry
or livestock farm or having other types of animal contact,
including domestic pets or livestock, poultry, or specific
wild animals or birds, was not associated with a high risk
for SARS.
Case Series of Index Patients
The index patients in each of the seven earliest affected
municipalities all had a date of onset before January 31,
2003 (Table 6). In five municipalities (Foshan, Jiangmen,
Zhongshan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen), outbreaks appear to
have occurred independently, but the outbreak in Heyuan
may be linked to that in Shenzhen and the outbreak in
Zhaoqing to that in Guangzhou. Index patients from the
eight other municipalities involved in the epidemic had a
date of onset after March 1, 2003, and a travel history to an
affected area, so these were excluded from the analysis. 
Patient 1 had the earliest case, identified by retrospec-
tive case searching. He lived with his wife and four chil-
dren in Foshan city and became ill on November 16, 2002.
He had not traveled outside Foshan in the 2 weeks before
his illness and had no contact history, but he had prepared
food including chicken, domestic cat, and snake. He was
part of a cluster of five patients, including his wife (42
years old, onset December 1), a 50-year-old aunt who vis-
ited him in the hospital on November 20 (onset November
27), and the aunt’s 50-year-old husband (onset November
30) and 22-year-old daughter (onset December 4) (online
Appendix, Cluster A; available from: http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/EID/vol10no6/03-0852_app.htm). None of patient
l’s four children were ill. Subsequent clusters in Foshan
included a food handler who infected a family member and
two healthcare workers (online Appendix, Cluster B) and a
food handler who infected several healthcare workers
(online Appendix, Cluster C).
Patient 2 lived in Heyuan but worked as a restaurant
chef in Shenzhen. His work was mainly stir-frying and did
not involve killing animals. His animal contact history is
unknown. He returned to Heyuan after becoming ill, was
admitted to the local hospital and transferred to
Guangzhou 2 days later. He infected a work colleague (41-
year-old man, onset December 16), six healthcare workers
in Heyuan (onset December 24–28), and a physician who
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Figure 3. Timeline of cases of severe
acute respiratory syndrome by week of
onset, November 1, 2002–April 30,
2003, in the seven predominantly affect-
ed municipalities of Guangdong
Province, China.
Figure 4. Number of patients with severe acute respiratory syn-
drome by age, and age-specific incidence (per 10,000 population),
November 1, 2002–April 30, 2003, Guangdong Province, China.accompanied him in the ambulance from Heyuan to
Guangzhou (28-year-old man, onset December 25). Patient
3, from Jiangmen, had no contact history, no history of ani-
mal contact, and no known forward transmission. Patient 4
worked as a chef in a Zhongshan township restaurant,
where he prepared steamed dishes and had contact with
snakes, civet cats, foxes, and rats. He infected his 30-year-
old wife (onset January 3), a 39-year-old male friend who
visited him in the hospital (onset January 5), and a physi-
cian (35-year-old man, onset January 4). Patient 4 was one
of two patients responsible for infecting at least three
healthcare workers (onset January 4–7). Patient 5, from
Guangzhou, had no history of animal contact other than
with a pet guinea pig that died a month before his symp-
toms began. He infected a hospital intern (onset January
14) and six other healthcare workers (onset January 14–22)
at Guangdong Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital.
Patient 6, from Shenzhen, had visited Hong Kong on
January 14, the day before symptom onset. However, he
had no contact history or contact with animals. He infect-
ed a work colleague (43-year-old man, onset January 29)
and died 14 days after becoming ill. Patient 7, from
Zhaoqing, was the only female index case. She traveled to
Guangzhou 2 weeks before becoming ill, although she
could not recollect contact with anyone with symptoms of
SARS. She worked at a market but did not sell animals.
She infected her 16-year-old son (onset February 3) and a
physician (25-year-old woman, onset January 31).
The index patient in the neighboring province of
Guangxi was a 26-year-old man, who infected several
family members. He worked as a driver for a wild animal
dealer and returned home to Guangxi after becoming ill on
January 8, 2003. The dealer supplied Guangdong markets
with wild animals from Guangxi, other Chinese provinces,
and Vietnam.
Discussion
The epidemic of atypical pneumonia in Guangdong
Province that we describe bears all the hallmarks of SARS
(8–11). It demonstrates the typical time course of the epi-
demic, the preponderance of cases in urban areas, and the
epidemiologic and clinical features of the disease. Since
the SARS epidemic began in Guangdong, we have sought
epidemiologic clues about the origin of the disease.
Approximately 75% of emerging infectious diseases are
zoonotic (12), and evidence is accumulating that an animal
origin for SARS is probable. However, phylogenetic
analysis and sequence comparisons of the coronavirus that
causes SARS (SARS-CoV) indicate that the virus is not
closely related to any of the previously characterized
human or animal coronaviruses (13). The reservoir is still
unknown, but SARS-CoV has been isolated from
Himalayan palm civets (Paguma larvata), and evidence of
infection has been found in a raccoon dog (Nyctereutes
procyonoides), a Chinese ferret-badger (Melogale moscha-
ta), and humans working at a live animal market in
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Table 1. Month of onset of SARS in community case-patients and in healthcare workers, Guangdong, China, November 2002 –April 2003
a 
Community case-patients contact history 
Month of onset   Yes (%)  No (%)  Healthcare worker (%)  Total
b 
Nov 2002  0 (0)  3 (100)  0 (0)  3 (100) 
Dec 2002  2 (11)  12 (63)  5 (26)  19 (100) 
Jan 2003  31 (18)  87 (50)  55 (32)  173 (100) 
Feb 2003  104 (14)  419 (58)  195 (27)  718 (100) 
Mar 2003  63 (20)  197 (62)  59 (18)  319 (100) 
Apr 2003  16 (9)  129 (74)  29 (17)  174 (100) 
Total  216 (15)  847 (60)  343 (24)  1,406 (100) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.  
bInformation was not available on contact history for 48 cases.  
Table 2. SARS cases (%) by month of onset and occupational status, Guangdong, China, November 2002–April 2003
a 
Occupational status
b  Jan 2003 or before no. (%)  Feb 2003 (%)  Mar 2003 (%)  Apr 2003 (%)  Total (%) 
Retired  2 (9)  44 (10)  46 (23)  32 (16)  124 (15) 
Worker  2 (9)  40 (9)  28 (14)  22 (11)  92 (11) 
Student  0 (0)  29 (7)  28 (14)  34 (18)  91 (11) 
Civil servant  3 (13)  43 (10)  26 (13)  19 (10)  91 (11) 
Housewife  0 (0)  20 (5)  28 (14)  30 (15)  78 (9) 
Food industry worker  9 (39)  20 (5)  4 (2)  19 (10)  52 (6) 
Farmer  1 (4)  10 (2)  4 (2)  4 (2)  19 (2) 
Teacher  1 (4)  7 (2)  6 (3)  4 (2)  18 (2) 
Child  0 (0)  9 (2)  4 (2)  4 (2)  17 (2) 
Other  2 (9)  49 (11)  14 (7)  18 (9)  83 (10) 
Unknown  3 (13)  157 (37)  14 (7)  8 (4)  182 (21) 
Total  23 (100)  428 (100)  202 (100)  194 (100)  847 (100) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bExcluding healthcare workers or case-patients with known exposure. Shenzen municipality (14). Seroprevalence of
immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibody to SARS-CoV is substan-
tially higher among traders of live animals (13.0%) in
Guangzhou municipality than among healthy controls
(1.2%), and the highest prevalence of antibody is among
those who traded primarily masked palm civets (72.7%)
(15). The pattern of the Guangdong epidemic is consistent
with the classical process of emergence from an animal
reservoir: the initial introduction of the virus into a nonim-
mune human population followed by the establishment
and rapid dissemination of infection (16). The traditional
practice of using wildlife for food and medicine, still
observed by some persons in southern China, offers an
effective bridge from a natural animal host to humans.
Several observations support this hypothesis. Two of the
seven index patients were restaurant chefs; food handlers
(who handle, kill, or butcher animals) were overrepresent-
ed among early-onset cases with no contact history
(including the first reported death, in a snake seller); and
patients with early onset were more likely than patients
with late onset to live near an agricultural produce market
(where live wild animals are generally offered for sale).
However, none of the early patients were commercial
farmers nor was living near a farm associated with
increased risk, findings that suggest a wild animal rather
than a livestock or poultry source. Although trade in
wildlife is now illegal in China, a range of mammalian,
avian, and reptile species can still be found in some pro-
duce markets, and a black market in these species probably
exists. Many such animals come from outside Guangdong
Province, often through Guangxi Province to the west, and
may originate in Vietnam or other parts of Southeast Asia.
The observation that the index patient in Guangxi Province
was a wild animal trader who supplied Guangdong mar-
kets offers some circumstantial evidence for such a link.
Our data have several limitations. First, surveillance for
SARS was only established in February 2003; thus, infor-
mation on earlier cases was collected retrospectively
and will be influenced by reporting bias. Second, our
analysis is based on cases that are not laboratory con-
firmed. Thus, the diagnosis relies on a clinical case defini-
tion and the sensitivity and specificity are unknown. Third,
SARS Origin in China
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(n = 662) 
Adults (18–64 y) 
(n = 534) 
Children  
(<18 y) (n = 51)  OR (95% CI)  p 
Older persons  
(> 65 y) (n = 66)  OR (95% CI)  p 
Fever  97.4  97.4  98.0  1.4 (0.2 to 29.3)    98.5  1.8 (0.3 to 37.9)   
Chills  51.8  56.0  31.4  0.4 (0.2 to 0.7)  0.002  37.9  0.5 (0.3 to 0.8)  0.008 
Malaise  42.3  45.7  23.5  0.4 (0.2 to 0.7)  0.004  31.8  0.5 (0.3 to 1.0)   
Headache  40.0  42.1  25.5  0.5 (0.2 to 0.9)  0.03  43.1  0.7 (0.4 to 1.3)   
Muscle ache  30.8  35.0  5.9  0.1 (0.0 to 0.3)  <0.001  16.7  0.4 (0.2 to 0.7)  0.004 
Cough  69.8  60.0  82.4  2.2 (1.1 to 4.9)  0.05  80.3  1.9 (1.1 to 3.8)  0.05 
Sputum  38.2  36.9  39.2  1.7 (0.9 to 3.3)    51.5  1.8 (1.1 to 3.1)  0.03 
Sore throat  16.3  16.7  25.5  1.1 (0.6 to 2.0)    6.1  0.3 (0.1 to 0.8)  0.04 
Runny nose  7.4  6.7  15.7  2.6 (1.1 to 5.7)  0.04  7.6  1.1 (0.4 to 2.8)   
Breathing 
   difficulty 
26.7  27.0  11.8  0.4 (0.1 to 0.8)  0.03  43.3  1.8 (1 to 3.0)  0.05 
Nausea  8.8  9.4  5.9  0.6 (0.1 to 1.8)    7.6  0.8 (0.3 to 2.0)   
Vomiting  6.2  6.0  7.8  1.3 (0.4 to 3.7)    7.6  1.3 (0.4 to 3.3)   
Diarrhea  8.6  9.0  7.8  0.9 (0.3 to 2.3)    7.6  0.8 (0.3 to 2.2)   
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; OR, odds ratio, using adults as the reference group; CI, confidence  interval. 
Table 4. Prevalence (%) of physical signs, chest x-ray findings, and blood count abnormalities on admission to hospital, SARS patients, 




(n = 662) 
Adults  
(18–64 y)  
(n = 534) 
Children 
(<18 y)  
(n = 51)  OR
b (95% CI)  p 
Older persons  
(>65 y)  
(n = 66)  OR
b (95% CI)  p 
Physical signs                 
Temperature (>38°C)  91.3  90.9  97.8  0.9 (0.3 to 3.9)    89.7  0.5 (0.1 to 1.2)   
Rigors  15.9  16.9  10.9  0.5 (0.2 to 1.3)    10.6  0.6 (0.2 to 1.2)   
Lethargy  10.3  11.8  2.0  0.2 (0.0 to 0.8)    4.5  0.4 (0.1 to 1.1)   
Myalgia  6.6  8.1  2.0  0.2 (0.0 to 1.2)    0.0  0.0 (0.0 to 0.6)  0.009 
Cough  50.0  46.6  64.7  2.1 (1.9 to 3.9)  0.02  68.2  2.5 (1.4 to 4.3)  0.002 
Sputum  10.4  8.6  13.7  1.7 (0.7 to 3.8)    24.2  3.4 (1.8 to 6.4)  <0.001
Dyspnea  6.0  5.8  2.0  0.3 (0.0 to 1.8)    12.1  2.2 (0.9 to 4.5)   
Clinical test results                 




13.9  14.2  16.3  1.2 (0.5 to 2.7)    8.3  0.6 (0.2 to 1.5)   
aOR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.  
bUsing adults as the reference group.  case investigation data were only available on approxi-
mately half of all cases because of poor transfer of data
(regardless, all categories of cases and all reporting dis-
tricts were similarly affected). Finally, information on sev-
eral earlier cases was incomplete or may be unreliable
(because of fear of prosecution associated with the trade in
wild animals), and some persons are no longer traceable. 
The data also highlight several unanswered questions.
The SARS epidemic started in Guangdong, but how it
began, why it peaked so suddenly, why Guangzhou was so
badly affected and other cities spared, and what caused the
gradual decline are all unclear. The decline in the epidem-
ic is probably a result of hospital and community infection
control measures introduced in early February, including
strict isolation of patients, use of protective equipment by
healthcare workers, prohibition of hospital visitors, and
guidelines on epidemiologic investigation. Such measures
may also explain why later cases did not trigger such exten-
sive chains of transmission. The concentration of cases in
urban areas may be due to factors associated with access to
healthcare or to incomplete or poor surveillance in rural
areas. However, in Guangdong Province, emphasis was
placed on reporting from less developed prefectures and
rural areas, including supervisory visits and review of hos-
pital records. Many larger cities in Guangdong, as well as
rural areas, were also apparently spared by the epidemic.
Although the possibility that SARS may pre-date the
earliest known case cannot be excluded, the temporal and
spatial clustering of index cases described in the case series
suggests that the initial source of the Guangdong epidemic
was either a single point source (with the links between
cities not identified) or several point sources in the Pearl
River basin. Outbreaks in cities affected later in the epi-
demic can all be traced to an imported case. These later
cases are probably due to horizontal transmission rather
than to further contact with the initial source. The reason
for the sudden rise in the incidence of cases at the beginning
of February is unclear, although the rise coincides with the
admission of a highly infectious index patient who trans-
mitted SARS to healthcare workers at three different hospi-
tals in Guangzhou city and to a large number of family
members (5,17). The absence of such a trigger may explain
the much smaller outbreaks in other cities in the province.
The case-fatality rate in Guangdong was also lower than
documented elsewhere (11,18). The most likely explana-
tion for this lower rate is the younger age structure of the
population in mainland China compared to that of Hong
Kong, Taiwan, or Canada. Children have slightly different
initial signs and symptoms than adults perhaps because
symptoms are milder (19), children are less able to describe
their symptoms, or the case definition is less specific in
this age group. Older persons are more likely to have a
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Table 5. Case-case comparisons of community SARS patients, Guangdong, China, November 2002–April 2003, according to contact 




(n = 406) 
Contact 
history  








c  Exposure  
(in previous 2 weeks)  Yes  No  Yes  No  OR (95% CI)  Yes  No  Yes  No  OR (95% CI) 
Visited hospital  17  70  22  13  6.83 (2.89 to 6.73)  0  10  45  169  0.00 (0.00 to 1.36) 
Visited by a friend  4  71  1  17  1.04 (0.04 to 8.93)  0  1  4  70  0.00 (0.00 to 337) 
Regular hand washing  122  15  44  3  1.80 (0.53 to 8.10)  4  1  118  14  0.48 (0.06 to 12.55) 
Travel history  45  179  13  62  0.83 (0.41 to 1.63)  0  10  45  169  0.00 (0.00 to 1.36) 
Animal contact  37  262  13  56  1.64 (0.80 to 3.25)  1  3  36  259  2.39 (0.09 to 23.02) 
Visited produce market  9  79  1  19  0.41 (0.02 to 2.75)  0  1  9  69  0.00 (0.00 to 148) 
Lives near produce 
  market 
89  169  19  43  0.84 (0.45 to 1.52)  5  0  84  169  Undef.  
(2.39 to Undef.) 
Lives near poultry or 
   livestock farm 
6  252  3  59  2.13 (0.42 to 8.81)  0  19  6  247  0.00 (0.00 to 40.15) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; CI, confidence interval; OR, odds ratio.  
bDefined as November 1, 2002–January 31, 2003 for early onset; February 1, 2003 –April 30, 2003 for late onset.  
cCases with no contact history and for whom case  investigation data are available. 
Table 6. Case series of index cases by municipality in SARS epidemic, Guangdong, China, November 2002 –April 2003
a 
Case no.  City  Sex  Age  Occupation  Date of onset  Animal contact 
Secondary 
transmission 
Case 1  Foshan  M  45  Administrator and 
village leader 
Nov 16, 2002  Yes  Yes 
Case 2  Heyuan  M  34  Restaurant chef  Dec 10, 2002  Unknown  Yes 
Case 3  Jiangmen  M  26  Factory worker  Dec 21, 2002  No  No 
Case 4  Zhongshan  M  30  Restaurant chef  Dec 26, 2002  Yes  Yes 
Case 5  Guangzhou  M  49  Office worker  Jan 2, 2003  No  Yes 
Case 6  Shenzhen  M  46  Office worker  Jan 15, 2003  No  Yes 
Case 7  Zhaoqing  F  39  Market vendor  Jan 17, 2003  Probably  Yes 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; M, male; F, female.   productive cough and difficulty breathing than younger
adults, which suggests either a misdiagnosis or an underly-
ing chest disease. 
The high proportion of community case-patients with
no apparent contact history, especially in Guangzhou city,
may be due to inadequate tracing, poor reporting of the
results of contact investigation, asymptomatic transmis-
sion, or the nonspecificity of the clinical case definition.
Similar findings have been observed in Beijing (20). Little
evidence as yet exists for asymptomatic infection with
SARS, but seroprevalence studies will help determine
whether this occurs. Laboratory testing of stored clinical
specimens may also clarify the specificity of the case def-
inition, particularly if positivity rates vary during different
stages of the epidemic or in cases with no contact history.
An alternative explanation for the absence of a contact his-
tory is the continuing existence of an environmental
source; however, this explanation is not borne out by case
investigation data. Clarifying this factor is important not
only to help understand the transmission dynamics of
SARS but also to allay concerns about the risk for epidem-
ic spread in the community if SARS is reintroduced.
Resolving this issue will be vital to prospects for prevent-
ing the spread of SARS beyond China (21).
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